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We have shaped our world as a world of pairs of opposites. Maybe under 
the influence of our own instincts and perceptions of some pairs we look at 
as “natural” (day-night, light-darkness, good-evil, life-death), we organize 
knowledge with similar criteria, building a world of hard and soft sciences, 
in which even knowledge and education have been divided. We have sci-
ences and humanities, and these structures have determined the way in 
which we understand the world, our lives, our professions and our percep-
tions. Even when we do not want to do it intentionally, it is very hard to us 
not to think in terms of true/false, objectivity/subjectivity, real/fake. And 
even when sciences and humanities have reached high theoretical levels in 
which this scheme of things has been brought into question, we still look 
at our world this way. Maybe it is because of the fact that this way of seeing 
draws neat borders to our frames of mind, and gives us a sense of safety.
Additionally, inside each pair, one of the terms gives us the higher 
sense of confidence. If we ask someone about his/her preferences, or 
about which one is “better”, we will find a dominant side: that one re-
lated to the notions of good, truth, objectivity … These words inspire con-
fidence. We have developed the tradition of trusting legitimated fields: 
history, science, press (even when press disappoints us everyday all over 
the world). Western culture is materially and metaphorically visual and 
believes in “proofs”, and many of our languages have words that relate the 
idea of proofs to our sight, like evidence. But vision stimulates imagination 
too fast, and we forget that what we see is not what we get: Gombrich asks: 
«Who would like to hear that La Gioconda is only a pigmented table and 
that we must imagine that there is a woman?»1. We trust our eyes. There 
is a woman. But no. There is a pigmented surface. An aesthetic achieve-
ment. And and there is a woman. And there are both, and none of them, 
in a certain way.
We learn to develop confidence in others: we find that some people 
(or systems, or languages) are dependable. When we say that something 
has been scientifically proved, or tested, we (as a species) seem to believe 
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as if we had seen the proof with our own eyes. When we hear about the 
perspectives of a poet or an artist, we may admire him/her, but we usu-
ally imagine his/her world as a unique universe, not scientifically proved, 
exclusive, subjective and far (and free) from the world of truth or reality. 
But how do we communicate with his/her work, how do we experience it? 
I am in a space, I am at a time. The signs I use when I point to the 
things around myself have to do with my here and now. The ideas of past, 
future, close and far are defined by my own co-ordinates. And the evolu-
tion of human beings about our consciousness of being centers of refer-
ence is important when we look at the story of humanity, as well as when 
we look at our own stories from our birth through all our life. In her works 
about deixis and anaphora, Anne Zribi-Hertz2 tries to demonstrate that 
languages develop from their own pointing devices to become more and 
more grammaticalized: we start adjusting our pointing resources towards 
the inner side of language, where we can organize relationships between/
among absent entities. As far as we do this, the spaces and times we per-
ceive are not only located in an external frame, but also in the world of 
introspection, imagination and discourse. Therefore, the growth of com-
plex thought in any human activity or discipline is a displacement from 
signals starting in ourselves to a discourse system in which we pretend to 
travel from ourselves to the others, to the otherness, and even to the other 
and the otherness we can find inside ourselves. Hence, deixis is not only a 
pointing mechanism: it is the starting point to more and more complex dis-
courses. And when we realize that our main (vital) spaces are not only per-
ceived through the senses, but are also spaces of evocation, imagination, 
or inner exploration, we start to organize our linguistic resources to build 
spacetimes. We all are creators of possible worlds: according to Berger and 
Luckmann, «even when “talking to myself” in solitary thought, an entire 
world can be appresented to me at any moment»3.
When we talk about this displacement from deixis to grammaticaliza-
tion, this does not mean that primary deixis is like a disposable napkin or 
glass. It means that our promenades through our worlds of discourse are 
permanently growing in complexity. Yes, we still show a corner with our 
finger when someone ask us for directions. We still understand our history 
with the reference of our birth date or our first day in college. It means 
that, in the same way we keep alive the notion of a sun rising and setting 
along with the formal knowledge about the Earth moving, we can accept 
and develop other “contradictions”, learning that we must contextualize 
them as processes that come from different frames of reference, frames 
that can perfectly live together, sometimes. A good example of this kind of 
situation is the one proposed by Meyrowitz regarding the growth of com-
munications and technology:
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The terms “print society” and “electronic-society” are simply shorthand descrip-
tions for a complex interaction among means of communication. A “print society” 
is actually an oral-writing-print society; an “electronic society” is actually an oral-
writing-print-electronic society. The shortened labels merely emphasize the latest 
significant development to have caused shifts in the rest of the communication 
spectrum.
In many ways, it is a fiction to discuss any one medium or type of medium in 
isolation. Media interact with each other within what might be called the media 
matrix – the interlocking network of all coexistent media4.
Human societies suffer some changes and uncomfortable situations when 
new media appear in scene. Some people reject the relevance of a new 
medium. Others seem to believe that this new medium is the one and only. 
The complexity of human realities is so big that, even when we have (and 
we need to have it) a deictical center, we must be able to move dynamically 
between worlds. We do have a paramount reality, but it is not our only re-
ality. Berger and Luckmann state that «Consciousness always return to the 
paramount reality as from an excursion. This is evident […] in the reality 
of dreams or that of theoretical thought»5. We construct worlds through 
language.
What about science? Bruce Gregory, in his book Inventing Reality: 
Physics as Language, observes:
There is a sense in which no one, including philosophers, doubts the existence of 
a real objective world. The stubbornly physical nature of the world we encounter 
every day is obvious. The minute we begin to talk about this world, however, it 
somehow becomes transformed into another world, an interpreted world, a world 
delimited by language – a world of trees, houses, cars, quarks, and leptons. In order 
to deal with the world, we have to talk about it (or measure it, or shape it – in any 
case we engage the world in terms of our symbols …6
Here we see that also physical sciences are looking at the idea of real-
ity as an idea that depends on conceptualization and language. Since we 
start representing what we see or what we think in pictures, numbers or 
words, we are talking about constructions, not about the universe as is. 
And this is part of the above (Zribi-Hertz) theory about the evolvement 
from deixis to anaphora, from simply pointing devices to complex ones. 
As if we were human fractal or holographic images, we do this from child-
hood to adulthood, reflecting the growth (and the problematization) of 
our civilization.
Hejl observes that sign systems «can be utilized as instruments with 
only one condition: that the society had previously developed the abili-
ties needed to co-ordinate their meanings»7. Part of this “co-ordination 
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of meanings” has to do with knowledge, preconceptions, including preju-
dice. To understand contemporary poetry or narrative has to do with the 
development of certain reading strategies. To enjoy contemporary art has 
to do with a sort of eye and sensibility training. We develop horizons of 
expectations, and we have coordinated the meanings of phrases such as 
“this has been scientifically proved” to accept them as truth. Nevertheless, 
scientific and literary “truths” are not static. They should be always writ-
ten, at least in our minds, with the consciousness of quotation marks.
We co-ordinate meanings to believe in science as “truth” or “fact”, 
and we accept literature as “fantasy”, “fiction”, and even “feeling”. Our 
usual co-ordination of meanings is closely related to our construction of 
pairs of opposites. Thomas Pavel points out that the production of truth 
underlies historically in the axis of every narrative/fictional project and 
that literary fiction started as a project about truth, devoted to record 
memorable facts, and to assign verisimilitude to a human conglomerate 
of myths8. According to this author, myths and legends have a deep sense 
of exemplary human truths behind heroes, gods and fantastic creatures. 
In the case of poetry, Carlos Bousoño states that poetic constructions are 
made to achieve acceptation and poetic images are intended to be some-
how “recognized” by us, like when we read or hear something that is, in 
fact, strange or unusual but, despite this, we find it curiously precise and 
convincing, like a theorem9. I would like to illustrate this poetic “truth” 
through some examples. Here is the end of a poem by Rafael Cadenas 
about the moment of waking up. The three last verses say: «the cup of cof-
fee / before going to the street / when I am not with myself yet»10. Vicente 
Gerbasi describes a scene of storm and the text ends with this: «The soul, 
with the thunder, resounds like a cellar of the sky»11. Venezuelan poet Luis 
Barrios Cruz wrote the following definition: «The cicada / is a dry leaf / 
singing»12. Or when T. S. Eliot wrote: «I do not know much about gods; 
but I think that the river / is a strong brown god: sullen, untamed and 
intractable»13. Poetic images, as Pierre Reverdy said once, have not to be 
brutal or fantastic, but distant and accurate14. Literary truth brings to us 
the “reality” of love, horror, chaos, death, madness by means of the “unre-
ality” of characters, places, fantasy and fiction. These simulations are not 
so far from the simulated environment of experimental science. Philippe 
Roqueplo, quoting Baudouin Jourdant, remarks:
[…] Baudouin Jourdant poses the following questions: “What does science rep-
resent? What is scientificity?” And he replies: “It is mainly another place and an-
other time”. 
Another place: the lab, the University, the research center; concrete, mysteri-
ous and secret places, located in the spaces of daily life […]. The laboratory is the 
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place in which the production of truth takes place, and, as such place, it becomes 
a kind of mythical space15.
Simulations in labs are semiotic and dialogic processes. When we devel-
op a consciousness of this condition, we have to recognize that, as David 
Locke claims, both science and literature are essentially interpretative, 
hermeneutic execises16. From this we can understand that this idea of the 
“production of truth” is related to the reconstruction of a series of condi-
tions of reference to simulate the space and time of a particular portion 
of the world. The quest for truth has a wide diversity of approaches and 
a diversity of readings as well. As Heinz Pagels affirms, there is a value 
of evolution survival in the fact of representing the world by means of 
myths, metaphors and scientific theories17. According to Locke, scientists 
and writers translate the world into metaphors, and this includes judge-
ment, know-how, sensibility and tradition in both cases. This includes the 
mythological names of constellations and the etymology of the names of 
chemical elements in the periodic table.
«The scientific method does not have an intrinsic condition that es-
tablish that people stop being people when they become scientists»18. To 
simulate, in fiction, and in the lab, is an action directed to grab something, 
to make this something ours. If we put this in the simple terms of real/
unreal, we have to say that it is not very “real” or objective to pretend 
that some things (landscapes, situations, creatures, etc.) are here and now 
just because we organize a simulated (linguistic or factual) environment in 
which it looks as if they were here and now. Or, at least, we would have to 
recognize that this “as if” expression is a trademark of fiction. 
The ability of representation and transportation between the “here 
and now” of different possible worlds to the language and syntax of the 
here and now of man seems to be a human attribute. Berger and Luckmann 
wrote that this capacity to transcend the here and now makes language 
able to “bridge different zones within the reality of everyday life and inte-
grates them into a meaningful whole”, to synchronize different biographi-
cal times, to converse about absent individual and collectives, to “make 
present a variety of objects that are spatially, temporally and socially absent 
from the here and now”19.
We can associate this statement with the fact that poetry, for example, 
brings in front of our eyes/minds realities and images that are not effec-
tively in front of us. The visual arts, do the same using a language without 
words. In laboratories people re-create conditions to simulate things that 
are not in front of the scientist. Astronomical observation makes absolute-
ly evident the differences between our here and now and the time of the 
stars (identified by researchers as past, in an essentially anaphoric act that 
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points towards ancient times, like the syntax of a fairy tale and its formula-
tion: once upon a time…).
Then, talking about science and literature means talking about alter-
ity and imagination, about different worlds, or different ways of dealing 
with worlds. Science, arts, literature, are discourses through which we (the 
reader, the researcher, the audience) build structures and environments 
that mobilize our spaces and times. Space and time simulations become 
our reality, and if we observe this process from a historical perspective, we 
will find what we call progress, development, evolution or simply instabil-
ity and doubt. 
Ernesto Sabato remarks the inconvenience of dogmatic positions in a 
real scientist. «If there is something sure about our knowledge is the fact 
that everything we know right now is partially or totally wrong»20. This 
historical condition of science has to do with the ideas of change, mobil-
ity, tolerance and possible worlds. In literature, we also find prejudices 
when dealing with the “truth” of literary formats and themes, and we find 
similar changes of “truths”. Luis Barrera Linares writes about the notion 
of Fantastic as the inventory of anything that «behaves violently against 
the rules that organize our world and takes us to a universe that we do not 
necessarily perceive as impossible, but as less probable inside the world 
in which we have fixed meanings through language», and states that «the 
fantastic or the unreal come from a particular reading situation in a spe-
cific historical context», it «may rise from the interaction between text 
and reader, and this interaction might change since the rules of artistic 
communication between a work and its audience are modified through 
history»21. This also applies to scientific production. Many scientific and 
technical dreams from the past that right now are part of our daily life, 
like nanotechnologies, cell phones, videoconferences, space adventures, 
clones and mother cells, once seemed to be “impossible”. Both science 
and literature transform dreams in possible worlds. To label something as 
non-literary or non-scientific is part of our current sets of conventions and 
preconceptions. I remember that in the early nineties I presented a paper 
about metafiction and self-reference, in which my main objects were rap 
songs and a parodic Brazilian soap opera named Vamp!, written by Anto-
nio Calmon. At that time, a group of more experienced colleagues (some 
of them were very prestigious literary critics in our academic environ-
ment), felt very uncomfortable when she saw that I was applying serious 
literary theory to such non-canonic corpus. Now these objects are com-
monly discussed in our conferences, classrooms and journals. Recently, 
in a science-fiction meeting in which an astronomer delivered a lecture 
to our undergraduate students, a student asked about the possibilities of 
life in other planets and galaxies. The lecturer said that, despite all our 
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knowledge, we might not recognize life from other environments, since 
the criteria that define life in other worlds could be unknown to us. The 
approach to our subjects varies as far as we understand that our conven-
tions are not forever. Every discipline questions itself from within, and 
every self-reflecting discourse comes from a consciousness of its own lan-
guage. In literature, this self-consciousness is an awareness of the literari-
ness of textual production and the impossibility of really grabbing the re-
ality around us. In science, the understanding of scientific self-reference as 
a language of a well-defined and regulated frame shows, as well, the tanta-
lic nature of human knowledge. A poem by Rafael Catalá about quantum 
physics puts these together when he writes: «quantum fields tell us that 
touching is not touching anymore»22. Our confidence in knowledge, in all 
metanarratives, has been replaced by uncertainty, by the consciousness of 
being permanent constructors of models, systems and signs. 
In a well known text by Jorge Luis Borges (On Exactitude in Science), 
we read about a map that ends superimposed to the real territory, losing its 
function as a map23. This alerts us against the fact that we seem to feel en-
thusiastic when we start seeing a possible closer relation between the sign 
(or the model, the system, the language, the theory) and the “real thing” 
until we find that we tried to impose a systematic and foreign order to a 
chaotic and unpredictable world, and that a sign, to work properly, must 
be a sign.
This is the reason why our continuous flirting with self-reference is so 
complex itself. We see self-inclusive discourses all around us, in computer 
games, comics, cartoons, tv shows, movies. But even when we rationally 
understand that, as Mandelbrot said, mountains are not conic, the sun is 
not round and coastlines never end, we keep alive our older geometrical 
canons to represent the world and to teach our children how to draw a 
landscape. It is not easy to understand a wave as a huge conglomerate 
of smaller waves (like the representation we see at Hokusai’s Great Wave 
of Kanagawa), to see the self-inclusive nature of our own blood system 
and to see that, in fact, we cannot have a definite measure of any coast-
line since they are not only irregular (considering rock, stones and even 
sand), but also are permanently changing. Abstraction is not only powerful 
and useful: additionally, its power of generalization offers us a sensation 
of certainty: Bloom affirms that «our society likes answers. Uncertainty is 
difficult for us to accept»24. However, when we realize the dimensions of 
abstractions, we identify that they are not exactly “objective”.
The history of literature, science and human knowledge has traced the 
road towards an unavoidable uncertainty. What we thought to be powerful 
inside science and literature is being posed into questioning from within 
their own fields of action and creation. 
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In literary studies, metafiction and mise en abyme are problematiza-
tions of discoursive safety. A short story like Continuity of Parks, by Julio 
Cortázar poses into question the certainty of our own real world, and raises 
the possibility of being living a fiction, or living in a world within another 
world, like the main character of Borges’s short story The Circular Ruins 
… Ernesto Sabato comments, «today Cervantes is as real – or as fictitious 
as Don Quixote. They both came to us through literary knowledge. In fact, 
Don Quixote is less fictitious, because we know more about his life, his 
story, his madness, his feelings and his adventures than about Cervantes»25. 
Then, our metacognition of literature is not so new. According to Waugh, 
we need meta-systems:
Language is an independent, self-contained system which generates its own 
“meanings”. Its relationship to the phenomenal world is highly complex, problem-
atic and regulated by convention. “Meta” terms, therefore, are required in order 
to explore the relationship between this arbitrary linguistic system and the world 
to which it apparently refers26.
We can compare the view of this metafictional theorist to the one of the 
physical sciences reflection. Bruce Gregory discerns this point: 
How could we compare a theory with the world? A physicist’s theory is a col-
lection of mathematical formulas, and the world… well, the world is something 
completely different. (…) If I say, “The dog is named Willard,” I am surely using 
the word Willard to refer to a real animal. There is obviously a difference between 
the word Willard and the dog. When I say, “Electricity is related to electrons in the 
wire,” am I not doing exactly the same thing? Am I not using the word electrons to 
refer to something out there in the world?
In order to talk about the relationship between a theory and the world, we can 
make use of what a logician calls a metalanguage27.
It seems that we are in front of a problematized Zeitgeist in which we re-
alize that what we represent are ways of representation. The transit from 
discourse based upon imitation to narrative and diegesis is a transit of con-
sciousness. And it must be said that traditions and older knowledge do 
not abandon us. Like in our example of mixed technologies in the world, 
classical physics is still alive; modern physics solves problems in a different 
way. We have older sonnets and rhymes, and we have contemporary poetry 
with all its problematic and imaginary compositions. We have traditional 
novels, and we have hard-to-read experimental narratives. Perspectives 
and media are all mixed up. As Janet H. Murray writes, «the traditions 
of storytelling are continuous and feed into one another, both in content 
and form”28. Nevertheless our binary thought is not comfortable with the 
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idea of living with things that seem to be mutually exclusive. (Wolfgang 
Iser would say that this is a condition of fiction.) As Sukenick says: «All 
accounts of our experience, all versions of “reality”, are of the nature of 
fiction»29.
One of the authors that we have found interesting to show the interac-
tion between the nature of narrative and the worlds of self-referentiality is 
the Argentinian writer Marco Denevi. In his work it is possible to see self 
conscious intertextuality and hypertextual links among texts, clearly close 
to technological hypertexts. Metafiction is a permanent way of narrating 
even in his works for children, and he uses it to generate uncertainty and 
to paradoxically build the certainty that our only truths are supported on 
fictions. 
Denevi’s novel Rosaura a las diez (translated as Rosa at Ten O’clock), 
originally published in 1955 is an interesting metafictional work30. The sup-
posed to be main character, Camilo, an art restorer, is presented to us by 
means of the stories told by other characters. In these stories, we learn that 
Camilo has an affair with a woman called Rosaura, a woman that the other 
characters have seen in a portrait painted by him. One evening Rosaura 
arrives to the house in which all the other characters live, and everything 
becomes mysterious, until the woman is murdered. But at the end of the 
novel we find a letter written by the woman… whose name is not Rosaura. 
Her face was the same everybody saw in the portrait, but the entire story 
was an invention, a fiction. Almost the whole novel is a group of narra-
tives about a character and a relationship that never existed [inside the 
novel], a character and a relationship that the other characters came to be-
lieve. Fictitious characters “read” and “write” a fiction inside a fiction, and 
intertextual references and particular simulations of languages create an 
environment of story that ended being the fantasy elaborated by Camilo. 
Denevi repeats this pattern in many of his works. The novel is built like 
a fractal representation, with self-inclusion, like in nature, math o visual 
arts. Its structure, which has been compared to the film Rashomon and 
to Wilkie Collins’s The Moonstone, is organized on the declarations of the 
characters in front of the police after a murder, and this creates from the 
very beginning a deceiving frame for the reader, because we tend to associ-
ate this situation with a context of truth. When we discover that the story 
of the main character is a fiction and we recognize that the other characters 
are the readers of this fictional project, we see that fiction is our possibility 
to build realities, so fiction is not so fictional… Or fiction is our only pos-
sibility to construct our reality, since we construct reality as we manage (as 
coders or decoders) signs about it.
I would like to mention a couple of other Denevi’s novels: Murders of 
the Holidays and Music of Lost Love31. In both texts, besides metafictional 
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elements, the reference to the idea of the preservation of corpses through 
a scientific method proposes death as one of the great themes of literature. 
Utilizing a technique related to taxidermy, an unknown character has pre-
served the body of the woman he loved, to keep her as if she were alive. 
And this shows not only a literary theme, but also a scientific one: the need 
to defeat death. This need seems to be a manifestation of power. To defeat 
death even under the form of simulacrum, text, fictional deceivement, is a 
fictional mechanism utilized by science and by literature. 
The example of death, just like others related to uncertainties and 
human feelings, is common to poetry, literature and science. We want to 
explain love and attraction using words and chemistry; we want to defeat 
death by means of writing and also by science, using medicine or taxi-
dermy… Today, the Internet takes us to the margins/boundaries of time, 
and death loses contour when we become virtual. Some people passed 
away but are still there, in their websites or emails. Now the old statement 
of writing a book, planting a tree and having a son has changed. Maybe 
today the way of defeating death is to build a website, and here we enter 
the idea of the virtual, another place in which science and literature meet, 
even more with the contemporary perspectives of science, technology and 
information. 
We need to review the true idea of the virtual, sometimes seen as a 
modern or in our daily lives when we think about entertainment, work and 
computers. In video games, the idea of the virtual invokes the participa-
tion of an agent who has an effect on the simulated environment with his/
her decisions/actions, even when he/she does not leave the chair in which 
is sitting in front of his console. From this point of view, the idea of the 
virtual is not new to literary studies: Iser refers to the “virtual dimension” 
of the text as the «coming together of text and imagination» in which the 
reader recreates the fictional world32. Foucault virtualizes the idea of lit-
erature when he puts it in a space of relationship of language and text: in 
his words, literature itself is a distance inside language, a kind of language 
that pivots on itself33. Then, virtuality and self reference as spaces of textual 
interaction activated by the reader give birth to each other. 
Here we are not talking about virtual reality devices, but about a con-
ception instead. N. Katherine Hayles affirms that «Virtuality is the cul-
tural perception that material objects are interpenetrated by information pat-
terns»34. Pierre Lévy declares that virtuality «does not refer to some false 
or imaginary world. On the contrary, virtualization is the very dynamics of 
a shared world; it is that through we share a reality»35. And these two state-
ments work for science and literature. Lévy also observes that language 
and writing are «two of the major instruments of virtualization» (ibid.), 
and objectivation/subjectivation in the dynamics of virtualization show the 
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self consciousness of our idea of reality as a convergence field of psycho-
social perceptions:
Subjectivation is the implication of technological, semiotic, and social means in 
the individual psychic and somatic functions. Objectivation will be defined as the 
mutual implication of subjective acts in the process of constructing a shared world. 
Subjectivation and objectivation are therefore two complementary aspects of vir-
tualization. In fact, in terms of what they do, neither subject nor object are sub-
stances but fluctuating nodes of events that mutually interface with and envelop 
one another36. 
These fluctuating nodes construct a cultural perception in which every-
day substance, objects and what we call reality become interwoven with 
information patterns. Maybe the world has been this way all the time, and 
what we historically call progress and our own discourse about it have 
brought to the surface more and more complex patterns, patterns that are 
in fact more difficult to ignore in order to maintain the nowadays impos-
sible isolated perception of reality as materiality. Our ideas about subject 
and object are not as safe as they used to be. Vattimo remarks that «the 
intensification of the possibilities of information about reality in its more 
diverse aspects makes everytime less and less conceivable the monolithic 
idea of one reality»37. Reality, according to this author, raises from the in-
tercrossing of multiple images, interpretations and reconstructions in per-
manent competition. 
Science and literature were metanarratives, and they had answers to 
some of our most intriguing questions. But now they specialize in posing 
new problems. They become virtual since, as Lévy declares, have processes 
that transform «spatiotemporal coordinates […] into a continuously re-
newed problem rather than a stable solution»38. This transforms our older 
solutions into problems, and, as literature and science in fact do, refor-
mulates the roles of fiction and reality: we start thinking that the material 
word is not so real, and we realize that our construction of models of real-
ity is our true real world. Trying to grab reality through models, science has 
to recognize that it is a discourse model itself: that the map will not work 
if it has the same size of the territory.
In the scientific world, David Bohm refers to the need of a new mode 
of language: a rheomode. According to Ford and Peat, Bohm has also 
drawn attention to what he feels to be a defect of our common language 
in that it enfolds what could be called a mechanistic view of the world39. 
The world is flowing in front (and inside) of us, and we have pre-
tended to “catch” this flow through several forms of representation. We 
even want to have fixed images of this flow in pictures, poems, scientific 
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theories, names. Our communicative methods are divisions, fragmenta-
tions and suspensions of the flow of the world, and the flow of our own 
perceptions and thoughts, into signs and symbols. In Bohm’s view, the 
ideal language would be a sort of verb continuum: our comprehension 
of substance is a fiction, since nothing is really static. Virtuality is similar 
to rheomode if we consider that the common ground of knowledge and 
perception works only because of dynamics. According to Bohm, nouns 
should have a kind of “ing” ending in order to represent the continuous 
changes of their referents, to make our language closer to the “reality” of 
the world… But… is our mind ready to do that? The (ha)hierarchical sys-
tem of language is like an operating system to human beings. We probably 
need that system with “fixed” or simulated fixed elements and moving 
verbal relations, in order to have the glimpse we need of the world… In the 
words of Tilley, «[h]owever much we might try to escape from language, 
we are trapped in its prison house. So, although it might appear a laud-
able aim to escape a linguistic frame, it is an impossibility. There can be 
no meaningfully constituted non linguistic semiological system»40. What 
Bohm sees as a mechanistic structure of languages against the fluent and 
dynamic changes of the world is represented in a poetical way by Wislawa 
Szymborska in this verses of her poem The Clouds:
I should hurry
with the descriptions of the clouds,
since after the thousandth of a second
they stop being those clouds, and start being others.
It is natural to the clouds
not to repeat themselves,
their shapes, shades, positions, or order.
Without the load of any memories,
they simply override facts.
They cannot be witnesses of anything.
In a second, they run away in all directions.41
There is a paradox in the fact that language and our vision of the world 
compartimentalize our perceptions of the Universe. But we do not seem 
to have options. When someone works in science or in literature, the pos-
sibilities of manipulating language increase. When human beings walk 
inside deeper and more complex worlds of models, they/we can realize 
that the ideas of here and now are less and less simple as soon as we con-
struct diversifications of our own self and our own knowledge. That is the 
reason why the idea of de-centered activities became so important since 
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the Baroque, after the human-centered renaissance thought. We became 
aware of our own mobility (physical, geographical and intellectual), and 
this made us conscious of the expanding nature of the world we build. 
Like in the Internet, we are permanent navigators of knowledge and mean-
ings. Science and literature have (re)discovered that the center is a pro-
cess, not the person, and a process can be neither stable nor fixed. We 
are networked, and the simulated conditions of heres and nows produced 
by science and literature for centuries somehow “knew” it, and there we 
always had a huge world of “as if”s. We were physical, material, “solid”. 
Now we start to perceive ourselves as virtual entities, not so solid, because 
of our self-consciousness, our technologies and our own problematization 
in space and time.
Lisa Roberts, paraphrasing Miles Orvell, observes that the xixth cen-
tury had a “culture of imitation” and the beginning of the xxth pretended 
a “culture of authenticity”, and proposes that our time constructs a culture 
of simulation, the living of experiences and sensations independently from 
the truth or falsehood of their concrete reality42. «The space of the future 
would be both of real and of virtual nature», comments Paul Virilio in an 
interview by Andreas Ruby43. 
We are processes, not products. Once upon a time our civilization be-
lieved that there was a center in literary texts (like an omniscient author), 
a possibility of monolithic truths. We believed in ourselves as centers of 
objectivity, and now we must realize that we are multiple centers of shared 
subjectivities. The center of a text is the process of navigating through it: 
reading is not only the linear sequence of words, but a multidimensional 
corpus of allusions and relationships, determined by culture, space, time, 
affectivity. Such center is fictional and instable by definition, and the pro-
duction of sense and meaning depends on the mobility of the reader. In 
the words of Pierre Lévy: «the production of meaning, no longer refers 
exclusively to the interiority of an intention, to hierarchies of esoteric sig-
nification, but to the individual appropriations of a navigator or surfer»44. 
It is fascinating how we have created a world that fits our dreams and 
creations at different times and geographies, and how this world challeng-
es those dreams and creations in a way that makes us look for new versions 
or new worlds as well. This consciousness that impulses us to notice from 
time to time that our approach to knowledge is not enough is the same 
that makes us understand that we are part of a complex universe in which 
our old worlds do not disappear: they are part of our heritage. We are that 
oral-written-print-electronical society. Our poetry has metric patterns and 
free verses, our novels go from omniscient narrators to polyphonic struc-
tures. Sciences have mechanistic and relativistic paradigms. Every way of 
communicating, creating and observing has its functions, its advantages 
Lourdes c. sifontes greco

and its role. Bruce Gregory observes that «[c]lassical physics demonstrat-
ed the power of a language that separates the observer and the observed, 
the subject and the object»45. Today, language tries to put together the ob-
server and the observed, the object and the subject as parts of the same 
systems. Both science and literature work with constructions of worlds and 
mediations of languages, and they are both realizing that we have being 
constructing wonderful worlds. Maybe technology is the place in which 
they shake hands, or one of the places that can teach us to understand 
a real dynamics of interaction. The problem of the observer and the ob-
served has to do with networks, connections, virtuality, rheomode and self 
consciousness about our own modes of representation. Vattimo seems to 
be right when he says that «self-transparency (to which media and sciences 
seem to lead us) is devoted to make evident the plurality of mechanisms 
and internal structures with which we have built our culture»46. What we 
have done is only to put our own confidence in “reality” into question, to 
know that simulation seems to be our eternal place of knowing. At least 
we start giving a place to experience, not limiting this to a “feeling” or 
“sensorial”, but also cognitive, linguistic, scientific, intellectual (not sepa-
rately from the other adjectives). We are starting to accept that we are not 
“in front of” a world, but inside it. We are part of it and having minds 
and intelligence and language seems to complicate what could have being 
a placid life as non-rational animals. Science and literature, at the same 
time, maintain and question their own systems. We know that we have to 
integrate ourselves to the flow of the world and the flow of our thought. 
We do not know if we will be able to do it, since language is our vehicle 
and also our barrier to do it… In one of his work about traveling, Eric 
Leed quotes this Buddhist sentence: «You cannot travel on the path before 
you have become the path itself»47. In an example that beautifully puts 
together science and literature, Julio Cortázar makes a synthesis of this 
problem. In his book about the astronomic observatory of Jaipur, India, 
Prose From the Observatory, Cortázar narrates the fictional experience of 
its creator, Jai Singh, in a poetic approach to the possibility of reaching the 
stars. The book ends with a reflection that states that «conciliation is pos-
sible, a world in which obverse and reverse will stop tearing each other, in 
which man will take his place in that joyful dance that we once called real-
ity»48… The approach to dreams, creation, poetry and knowledge requires 
the self-conscious inclusion of the observer into the observed, without our 
old quests for safety, knowing that we are part of the world we observe and 
that the world we observe as humans is perceived through our schemes 
and systems. Our canonic views about objectivity-subjectivity must be 
re-signified, our perceptions about the placement of objects and subjects 
need our consciousness about their virtual condition:
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Damned if he cares about the answer, Jai Singh wants to be that what he asks for. 
Jai Singh knows that this thirst will torture him again. Jai Singh knows that only 
being the water he will stop being thirsty.49
Will we be able to be the road, to be the water, to stop thinking that we have 
a frame of solid truths independent from ourselves and from the world(s) 
we observe? Science and literature are both working on it, on the virtual 
patterns that shape us and connect our knowledge and our humanity, our 
sciences and our humanities: those worlds of representations separated by 
the schemes we created, even when they are not separable within us.
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